Strengthening the development impact of UNCTAD's investment policy reviews by Jungnickel, Rolf & Koopmann, Georg
www.ssoar.info
Strengthening the development impact of
UNCTAD's investment policy reviews
Jungnickel, Rolf; Koopmann, Georg
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jungnickel, R., & Koopmann, G. (2005). Strengthening the development impact of UNCTAD's investment policy
reviews. (DIE Discussion Paper, 5/2005). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-117136
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.

  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening the Development Impact of 
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Reviews 
 
Rolf Jungnickel / Georg Koopmann 
 
 
 
 
 
Research project on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn 2005
  
 
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik  
ISSN 1860-0441 
 
 
 
Jungnickel, Rolf: Strengthening the development impact of UNCTAD’s investment policy reviews : research 
project on behalf of the federal ministry for economic cooperation and development / Rolf Jungnickel ; 
Georg Koopmann. – Bonn : Dt. Inst. für Entwicklungspolitik, 2005. – (Discussion paper / Deutsches Institut 
für Entwicklungspolitik ; 5/2005)  
ISBN 3-88985-288-2 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolf Jungnickel, head of HWWA research unit „International mobility of firms and labour”, studied eco-
nomics in Hamburg and Freiburg. The main focus of his work lies in internationalization process as well as 
in structural policy.  
E-Mail: jungnickel@hwwa.de 
Georg Koopmann, Senior Economist at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), stud-
ied economics in Cologne and Hamburg. The main focus of his work lies in trade policy and international 
economic integration.  
E-Mail: georg.koopmann@hwwa.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 4, 53113 Bonn 
℡ +49 (0)228 94927-0 
  +49 (0)228 94927-130 
E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de 
www.die-gdi.de 
  
 
Contents 
Abbreviations 
Preface 
Summary 1 
1 General approach 3 
The overriding aim should be development, not streamlining FDI policy 3 
Which countries? 4 
2 Specific issues 5 
2.1 Content-related issues 5 
Focus and coverage 5 
Investment guide or policy guidance? 7 
Legal framework vs. investor experience and non-investor views 7 
Impact of FDI on economy and society 8 
Indication of sector-specific FDI opportunities? 9 
Coordination of internal policy areas 9 
Regional IPRs? 11 
Quick Response Window as an “IPR light”! 12 
2.2 Process-related issues 13 
Involving stakeholders 13 
Internal coordination at UNCTAD 13 
External Coordination 14 
Discussion and communication of the final report 15 
More concrete recommendations! 15 
2.3 Implementation-related issues 15 
Mandatory follow-up meetings 16 
Integration with bilateral and multilateral assistance 16 
Bibliography 17 
 
  
  
Abbreviations 
ASIT  Advisory Services on Investment and Training 
BIT  Bilateral Investment Treaty 
DITE  Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development 
DTIIS  Diagnostic Trade and Investment Integration Study 
DTIS  Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FIAS  Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
GAT  General Agreement on Trade in Service 
HWWA  Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
IC  Investment Compass 
IIA  International Investment Agreement 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPR  Investment Policy Review 
IRCB  Investment-Related Capacity-Building 
IRTA  Investment-Related Technical Assistance 
ITC  International Trade Center 
LDC  Least Developed Country 
MAI  Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
QRW  Quick Response Window 
SACU  Southern African Customs Union 
SME  Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
TPC  Trade Policy Clinic 
TPR  Trade Policy Review 
TRCB  Trade-Related Capacity-Building 
TRIM  Trade-Related Investment Measure 
TRTA  Trade-Related Technical Assistance 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 
 
 

  
 
Preface 
This study has been carried out for the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) in cooperation with HWWA and UNCTAD. 
The study focuses on two issues: 
• the role of FDI in generating economic growth in developing countries; 
• how should UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Review process be organized to attract 
more and better FDI? 
Compared to a number of simplistic positions, which tend to demonize either the role of 
FDI in developing countries or those who see them as a “deus ex machina” for the promo-
tion of economic growth, the approach adopted by the authors is highly differentiated. 
In line with a number of recent studies on FDI and development, the authors emphasize 
the need to analyse the specific circumstances and conditions of a given country to deter-
mine whether and how FDI can promote economic growth. 
According to the authors, a central precondition for FDI to play a positive role in generat-
ing growth effects is the existence of a certain absorption capacity in host countries. They 
also point out that basic conditions of internal stability and transparency must be fulfilled 
to set the stage for FDI inflows. In this context it is also emphasized that, even in cases 
where in principle a sound FDI perspective exists in a country, FDI should be considered 
more as one factor of development alongside domestic investment in both real and human 
capital. 
After this rather brief, but very general discussion of the role of FDI in developing coun-
tries, the main part of the study focuses on various issues relating to UNCTAD’s Invest-
ment Policy Review (IPR) process. The issues discussed are based on long experience of 
UNCTAD’s IPR programme in more than 15 countries. The authors conduct a detailed 
analysis of various content-related issues (e.g. should there be a sector-specific FDI pol-
icy?) as well as process- and implementation-related issues (e.g. how should stakeholders 
be more closely involved, or how could coordination with other institutions, such as the 
World Bank, OECD and UNDP, be intensified?). Another important issue discussed is the 
criteria for selecting the countries for which an IPR should be organized. Even though the 
report and recommendations are addressed mainly to those actors and decision-makers 
who are directly or indirectly involved in the practical IPR process, they also provide in-
teresting insights for academic and non-academic experts in this field. 
 
 
 
Bonn, July 2005   Tatjana Chahoud 
  German Development Institute 
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Summary 
1. IPRs can be a very useful instrument for making FDI policy more effective for the 
development process. 
2. IPRs should not focus exclusively on foreign direct investment but rather on in-
vestment in general and consider FDI as one of several elements in the develop-
ment process. 
3. UNCTAD should, in accord with donor countries, take a greater say in the selection 
of the countries reviewed. The starting point should be an analysis of the absorption 
capacity and the need for external assistance in the countries in question. 
4. In view of widely differing domestic capacities and different needs for and institu-
tional policy advice, UNCTAD should undertake more efforts to adapt the volume 
of issues covered to the advice actually needed. Activities could extend from Quick 
Response Window action on one or few specific problems to an “IPR light” or a 
full-fledged IPR. 
5. Recommendations should be based more on investors’ and non-investors’ experi-
ences and assessments than on a formal investment framework. Assessment of the 
impact and definition of investment opportunities should be more cautious, given 
the complexity of these issues. 
6. Much weight should be given (1) to the coherence of the various policy actions and 
(2) to compatibility of national FDI policy and obligations resulting from interna-
tional treaties. 
7. Recommendations regarding policy measures should often be more precise. 
8. Support should be given to UNCTAD policy with a view to making use of the know-
ledge and resources available in other programs. Co-ordination with other institutions 
(World Bank, OECD, UNDP, etc.) should be intensified. However, this should focus 
on exchange of facts – competition should continue as far as the provision of advices 
concerned. 
9. Involvement of stakeholders from government, business, and civil society can con-
tribute to better acceptance of an IPR. Top-level government support likewise ser-
ves to improve the chances that recommendations will in fact be implemented. 
UNCTAD’s policy in this respect should be continued as long as recommendations 
are not diluted and become featureless. 
10. Implementation of recommendations should be promoted by integrating IPR activi-
ties more into “normal” development assistance. A certain share of the IPR budget 
should be reserved for implementation action, such as meetings, certain consulting 
activities, and development of domestic human resources. We consider a 30 % 
share appropriate. 
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1 General approach 
The overriding aim should be development, not streamlining FDI policy 
1. The IPR program has been operating for over 10 years now. A total of 15 countries have 
been covered so far, with another two (Kenya and Zambia) in the pipeline and more than 
20 countries having applied for an IPR. The mere fact that (Foreign) Investment Policy 
Reviews have been asked for by an increasing number of countries is proof enough that 
the IPR program is encountering widespread demand and is in principle a meaningful one. 
Critical remarks in the following evaluation should, therefore, not be understood as criti-
cism in principle. Such remarks are meant instead to point to some aspects that might be 
worth considering in country studies that are in preparation and whenever further applica-
tions come in. 
2. Although the IPRs completed to date cover a wide range of countries that differ substan-
tially in size and market potential (e.g. Brazil and Egypt vs. Mauritius and Nepal), income 
level (Botswana and Sri Lanka vs. Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia), endowments with 
natural resources, geographical position relative to the “First World,” and in terms of po-
litical systems, there seem to be some common assumptions underlying the program. The 
first one is that there is an FDI potential for each country that has been covered already or 
is expected to apply for an IPR. Second, activation of this potential should be a priority 
field of national policy. Furthermore, judging from the IPRs available, it seems that 
UNCTAD presumes that one given concept fits all countries (one-size-fits-all approach). 
3. In this evaluation, we start out from a more “neutral” point of view in discussing these 
issues. We see development as the overriding aim and focus of IPRs. To this end, we con-
sider it necessary, before starting work on an IPR for a particular country, to discuss 
whether there really is a potential for substantial FDI in the country in question that would 
in fact benefit the country. 
4. Our basic assumption is that economic growth in developing countries cannot generally be 
seen as depending on FDI and that FDI does not necessarily promote economic growth. It 
all depends on targeted policies and appropriate regulatory measures. Ample evidence 
supporting this view is provided by various studies (e.g. Carkovic / Levine 2002 and 
OECD 2002). These studies conclude that a certain domestic absorption capacity is 
needed for FDI to generate growth effects in host countries. By the same token, minimal 
conditions regarding internal stability and transparency are needed to set the stage for FDI 
inflows (OECD 2003). If absorption capacity is lacking or minimal standards are not met, 
FDI-focused policy would be a bet on the wrong horse. It could run the risk of encourag-
ing the illusion that FDI-focused policy could be an easy way to bring forward domestic 
development and that promoting FDI could be a substitute for internal institutional and 
policy reforms. This is not to imply that countries with limited absorptive capacity do not 
need FDI or should not seek to attract FDI. To the contrary, with proper policies, FDI can 
help build domestic capability. The point is here simply to emphasize that in such cases 
assistance programs such as IPRs should give priority to the development of domestic re-
sources and stability. 
5. Even in cases where, in principle, a sound FDI perspective exists in the respective coun-
try, FDI should be considered more as one factor of development alongside domestic in-
vestment both in real and human capital. Foreign-owned firms more or less closely inter-
act with domestic ones, as has been shown in detail in various UNCTAD World Invest-
ment Reports. In fact, the degree of integration of FDI into the local economy or, in politi-
cal terms, of its “mainstreaming“ into an overall development strategy is the key measure 
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of its contribution to sustainable development. Investment Policy Reviews should there-
fore generally look at FDI as part of the overall investment picture, or in a broader in-
vestment-growth framework, and analyze FDI policy in a wider industrial-policy context. 
Which countries? 
6. According to the mandate adopted in UNCTAD IX (Midrand) and reaffirmed at in 
UNCTAD X (Bangkok), the assistance that UNCTAD provides to developing countries 
through the IPR process should be demand-driven. In other words, IPRs should be carried 
out only in countries that have expressed interest by requesting UNCTAD to undertake 
such a review. The choice of countries receiving an IPR would thus result from a self-
selection process. After finance is secured from one or several donor countries, UNCTAD 
organizes and undertakes the study if sufficient support from the respective government 
can be expected. This procedure is unsatisfactory since there is a danger that countries that 
receive support through IPRs may not always be those that could benefit most from it. In 
some developing countries, for instance those emerging from lengthy civil conflict or de-
structive war, a policy review that focuses on domestic investment, capacity-building, re-
habilitation, and reconstruction is likely to be more directly relevant than one whose aim 
is to increase FDI inflows. This is not to say that FDI does not have a role to play in such 
countries but instead to emphasize the point that the priority need of countries may vary 
depending on the situation prevalent there, and that the selection of countries for review 
must reflect that. Thus, in order to maximize the impact of IPRs, UNCTAD must exercise 
a degree of flexibility in identifying, among countries that have expressed interest, those  
which could and should benefit from the IPR process. 
7. We go even further here and suggest that UNCTAD, in accord with respective donor 
countries, should have a greater say in the decision as to which countries are “fit” for an 
IPR. One option in the IPR program should therefore be the recommendation not to bank 
on FDI but instead to start out by developing indigenous resources. UNCTAD (as well as 
donor countries) should be prepared to recommend that some demands for FDI-focused 
policy reviews be redirected as requests for general policy-focused advice and “normal” 
development assistance. The main decision criteria could include 
— general level of development, 
— political and administrative stability, 
— commitment of the government concerned to implement recommendations, 
— quality of infrastructure, and 
— availability of natural resources. 
8. On this basis, it would be possible to avoid undertaking IPRs in situations with few pros-
pects of attracting substantial FDI. Likewise, it would be possible to forego an IPR for 
countries that could do the job with their own resources (Brazil would be a case in point). 
If, however, self-selection is accepted, the preceding reasoning suggests that both volume 
and focus of the individual studies should be quite different. 
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2 Specific issues 
9. Bearing in mind these general remarks on the one hand and the experience made with the 
IPR program on the other, we find ourselves face to face with a number of specific issues 
which could be taken into account in further developing IPRs. Most of these issues were 
the subject of the terms of reference for this evaluation, and they were addressed during 
our talks in Geneva with UNCTAD and country representatives and experts. These issues 
are both content-related and process- and implementation-related. We are well aware that 
this classification is a bit arbitrary. It is especially content and process-related issues that 
have a bearings on implementation. 
2.1 Content-related issues 
Focus and coverage 
10. Among content-related issues, one basic question concerns the overall orientation of In-
vestment Policy Reviews, i.e. their focus and coverage. Essentially, IPRs are a two-
pronged exercise aimed at both improving the strategies, rules, and procedures governing 
investment in a country under review and making these policies and institutions more 
transparent internally (i.e. for “stakeholders” within the respective country) and externally 
(i.e. with regard to other countries and stakeholders). The original mandate for IPRs given 
at the UNCTAD Conference in Midrand (South Africa) in 1996 provided for the reviews 
to “familiarize other Governments and the international private sector with an individual 
country’s investment environments and policies.”1 This intention was explicitly (and ex-
clusively) referred to in the preface to the first IPR report (on Egypt, 1999) prepared by 
the UNCTAD Secretariat. By contrast, in the preface to the most recent IPR report (on 
Brazil, 2005), apart from the call for transparency (and preceding it), the stated intention is 
“to help countries improve their investment policies”. The IPR process thus appears to 
have evolved beyond a mechanism designed to enhance transparency into an instrument 
of technical assistance and capacity-building conceived to enable client countries to de-
sign appropriate policies for investment from abroad and thus to attract FDI and benefit 
from it. 
11. This bears resemblance to developments in the field of trade. Trade Policy Reviews under 
the aegis of the World Trade Organization have increasingly performed a technical assis-
tance function for trade-related capacity-building beside their traditional role of providing 
a forum for achieving transparency in the trade policies and practices of WTO members. 
They are now more systematically used to detect any shortcomings in this policy field, to 
enhance interaction between the government agencies concerned, and to identify specific 
areas where technical assistance may be required (needs assessment). This is especially 
true for TPRs on behalf of Least-Developed Countries. 
12. The yardstick for improving investment policies is their anticipated significance for de-
velopment and growth that is sustainable and serves to reduce/alleviate poverty. Assessing 
such effects would first require identification of policy areas or measures that have a ma-
jor bearing on FDI and then efforts to systematically gauge their development impact or 
the role they play in  attracting “quality“ FDI. To this end, an analytical framework or 
                                                 
1 See: Midrand Declaration and A Partnership for Growth and Development, UNCTAD Document TD/377, 
24 May 1996, paragraph 89(c). 
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“taxonomy” would be needed that relates the activities of foreign-owned companies, and 
in particular their cross-border and domestic linkages, to the development of the overall 
economy and in this context also allows for international comparisons (“benchmarking”). 
13. A “holistic” view of FDI along such lines calls for adoption in IPRs of a broad-based pol-
icy approach. Together with an analysis of foreign and general investment regimes and re-
lated reforms in the country under review, investment policy evaluations should also point 
to other necessary ingredients of a reform program. Complementary elements are likely to 
include measures to advance human capital development, upgrade infrastructure, or im-
prove the institutional environment. In this respect, too, IPRs would come close to TPRs, 
with their wide coverage of “trade-related” policies (including investment regimes) and 
emphasis on the interaction of these policy areas with macroeconomic and structural poli-
cies guided by the notion of “mainstreaming” trade into national (economic and social) 
development plans and poverty reduction strategies.2 In a similar way, IPRs would cover a 
broad range of “investment-related” policies (including trade regimes) aimed at “main-
streaming” FDI or matching the characteristics of foreign investors with the development 
needs of host countries. 
14. The approach outlined above would basically apply to the countries under review, irre-
spective of their state of development or other characteristics and special circumstances 
(like civil war or unrest, ethnic conflict etc.) prevalent in certain countries or country cate-
gories. However, different weights would naturally have to be assigned to different parts 
of the analysis depending on the case at hand. In LDCs, for instance, FDI strategies would 
typically have to be discussed first and foremost in the context of poverty reduction 
strategies and efforts to strengthen the legal and institutional framework for coherent and 
sound policy-making. IPRs for such countries should also focus on identification of con-
straints to private-sector development in general, of both domestic and foreign firms. Con-
straints might e.g. include dysfunctional infrastructure, high costs and inefficient delivery 
of services (especially in the public utilities sector), or a shallow and ineffective financial 
system.3 
15. In some cases, the prime question to be asked is of course whether there is a potential for 
economically advantageous FDI at all or, put differently, to what extent the country envis-
aged is politically and/or economically in a position to “absorb” beneficial foreign in-
vestment in the first place. The smaller (positive) effect on growth that FDI seems to have 
in LDCs as compared to more advanced developing countries may indeed be attributed to 
the presence of “threshold externalities” (OECD 2002, 10). Countries would accordingly 
need to have reached a certain level of development in education, health, physical infra-
structure, technology, or financial intermediation before being able to take advantage of a 
foreign presence in their markets.4 At the same time, engagement of foreign investors in 
these areas could help to attain this level and eliminate bottlenecks. In any event, however, 
increased investment and/or additional risk taking (by domestic or foreign firms) is 
                                                 
2 As defined by the WTO, mainstreaming of trade “involves the process and methods of identifying and inte-
grating trade priority areas of action into the overall framework of country development plans and poverty 
reduction strategies”. (WTO 2000, 1) 
3 These were major constraints referred to in the recent Trade Policy Review for Sierra Leone, for example, 
which currently is rated the poorest country in the world (WTO 2005, 25–26). 
4 Available empirical evidence suggests that human capital and the ability to effectively absorb foreign tech-
nology are particularly important for FDI as a means of promoting economic growth in developing coun-
tries. Accordingly, promotion of human capital, technological capabilities, and economic development 
would lead to more FDI inflows, which in turn would stimulate further economic growth and enhance com-
petitiveness (Li / Liu 2004, 404). 
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unlikely to materialize and be sustained in an environment of major and persistent politi-
cal instability.5 In this case, FDI potentials are likely to be limited. Although UNCTAD’s 
IPRs tend to focus more on FDI, efforts must be made to incorporate policies that are tar-
geted primarily on domestic investment and the linkages between domestic enterprises 
and foreign affiliate firms in the country in question. 
Investment guide or policy guidance? 
16. In our talks with UNCTAD representatives and experts involved in the IPR program, it 
was clearly and unanimously stated that IPRs should not be an investment guide but 
rather guidance for national FDI policy. We understand that the difference between an in-
vestment guide and guidance for FDI policy is in the perspective taken. While FDI guides 
should follow and anticipate an international investor’s perspective, the IPR program is 
more geared to reflect the views of the government and all other parties affected by FDI in 
the host country. For two reasons we have some difficulties in following the view that 
IPRs are and have to be fundamentally different from investment guides. 
17. First, it seems to us that the set-up of the IPRs available does in fact have some marked 
elements of an investment guide. Although in detail the structure differs among the coun-
tries covered, the general set-up is similar: The reports start with an overview of the inter-
nal FDI pattern. This section includes – mostly rather brief – assessments of the impact on 
the host economy. The main sections of the reports (both in terms of quantity and impor-
tance) work out the legal framework for investment and discuss FDI strategies and oppor-
tunities against the background of  
— locational strengths and weaknesses 
— political priorities of the government and  
— development needs defined by other national stakeholders. 
These sections clearly have investment guide character. 
18. Our second argument is: There is no need for IPRs to be different from investment guides 
in all respects since one core aim of the IPRs is, as noted, to familiarize the private sector 
with investment opportunities in the respective country. IPRs can only be successfully im-
plemented within the legal and political system of the host country (i.e. with effect of at-
tracting more FDI) if the policy recommendations and the outline of investment opportu-
nities at least to some extent appeal to foreign investors. At the same time, it may be of in-
terest for foreign investors to know the host governments’ and other stakeholders’ priori-
ties regarding FDI. 
19. On the whole, it therefore seems that the two products have a significant overlap and that 
this overlap should be considered not as a problem but a result of efforts to make IPRs 
more relevant for investment practice. 
Legal framework vs. investor experience and non-investor views 
20. The main parts of the IPR consist of a description and discussion of the legal and adminis-
trative framework and the experience of foreign investors in the country in question. The 
latter are integrated into various sections. While framework facts certainly are important 
                                                 
5 On this, with reference to the Trade Policy Review of Burundi, see Milner (2004, 1376). 
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for (potential) investors, experience in many countries, in particular in developing coun-
tries, tells us that actual investment conditions depend to quite an extent on how the rules 
of the game are actually applied. This can best be taken into account by confronting for-
mal rules with investors’ assessments. UNCTAD makes use of this information. However, 
we consider it prudent to give even more weight to actual practice than to formal rules. 
21. In this context, a related aspect was dealt with in greater detail: To look into the reasons 
why internationally operating firms have not invested in a respective country, or in cases 
where foreign investors have disinvested, to determine why they have done so and what it 
would take to get them to invest again in the same country. Surveys of international inves-
tors of the kind that have been conducted by UNCTAD and used in IPRs, for example in 
the one on Peru, could be a useful instrument in this context. By placing explicitly more 
weight on views of foreign non-investors, the government could gain some clues as to 
where reforms might be needed to attract new overseas investors. It would help to stream-
line and adjust the investment framework, both regulations and institutions, in a way that 
is conducive to FDI and not necessarily detrimental to the respective location. 
Impact of FDI on economy and society 
22. The IPRs available present examples of individual or groups of FDI projects and their 
impact on the host economy, primarily on development and human resource use as well as 
on technology and external position. This information can demonstrate to the government 
and the general public that (more) such FDI will bring with it more jobs, a better qualified 
workforce, technological catch-up processes, an improved external position, and, gener-
ally, income growth. This would make promotion measures justifiable. By the same token, 
reports on positive experience could motivate foreign firms to consider investment in the 
respective country. 
23. However, it seems to us that the impact sections in the IPR are a bit too oversimplified to 
serve as a basis for policy conclusions. Especially in view of 
— the comprehensive aim of IPRs to promote development and 
— the crucial role of the direct and indirect links between domestically and foreign- and 
owned firms, 
the presentation of individual cases (largely restricted to positive ones, thereby leaving 
out critical aspects) and the limited room available for these presentations does not meas-
ure up to the complexity of the issue. Such presentations may give impressions of possi-
ble first-round effects of FDI. However, a sound analysis of the effects on the local econ-
omy would have to take into account, for example, any possible crowding out or crowd-
ing in of local SME as well as effects on labour outside the foreign affiliate. Economic 
impact always has to be assessed in the context of competition in factor and product mar-
kets and with a view to the prevailing policy and administration framework. An econ-
omy- and society-wide perspective should be taken. 
24. It is obvious that with limited time and financial resources it is not possible to conduct a 
comprehensive impact analysis in an IPR. However, it would be helpful if UNCTAD 
made fuller use of the competence and resources available to it and developed a compre-
hensive database (a sort of benchmark) which could be used to draw on representative in-
formation about economic and social impacts of FDI under given investment regimes. 
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, an excellent source, could be used to this end. 
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Indication of sector-specific FDI opportunities? 
25. The IPRs available put some emphasis on identifying investment opportunities in a more 
or less detailed manner, often on a sector-specific basis. It is obvious that specification of 
profitable and sustainable investment opportunities could serve as valuable orientation for 
actual and in particular for potential foreign investors. 
26. If, however, the opportunities indicated result largely from politically set priorities rather 
than from competitive and market conditions or from resources available, this can tend 
more to distort investment decisions than to help the development process and contribute 
to sound company growth. There have been cases in which UNCTAD has been re-
quested to develop an investment promotion strategy to attract investment into sec-
tors and/or activities identified by a government as priority areas in a national devel-
opment plan or PRSP. In this situation, UNCTAD should do its best, within its areas 
of competence, to provide policy advice on the feasibility of attracting investment 
into the selected sectors as well as on the measures required for investment targeting. 
Otherwise, an IPR may run the risk of leading to inefficient structures in the long run. 
27. In our view, identifying (and promoting) sector-specific investment opportunities is gen-
erally difficult because of information deficits. A more cautious approach in formulating 
‘opportunities’ would be useful. It would be sufficient to briefly name government priori-
ties as one point of orientation for potential investors. Another piece of useful information 
could result from an outline of the experience of countries competing for FDI, e.g. 
neighboring countries. On the whole, one more realistic and useful role for IPRs would be 
to improve the information on the side of potential investors by outlining a host country’s 
pattern of structural change and development and by identifying supply-side constraints in 
the host economy. Would-be investors could then take their decision on that basis. 
Coordination of internal policy areas 
28. This issue mainly concerns policy coherence. It has two major dimensions: 
— Consistency between policies affecting FDI at the national level and institutional coor-
dination among government bodies charged with formulating, implementing, and 
overseeing these policies. 
— Compatibility and compliance of national policies with international commitments and 
obligations. 
In both cases the overriding objective is to attract “quality” FDI. 
29. Foreign investors in many countries find that other measures, not necessarily directly re-
lated to foreign investment, often have a more critical impact on their business than FDI-
specific instruments. Such policies include areas as diverse as international trade, foreign-
exchange arrangements, competition, taxation, labor, sectoral regulations or property 
rights, and contract enforcement, which affect domestically and foreign-owned companies 
alike and have to do with a multiplicity of concerns apart from investment. In IPR reports 
these are each discussed separately in the regular chapter on the investment framework. 
However, little attention is paid to the linkages between these policy areas and to the in-
teraction (or lack of it) between the agencies involved. It might therefore be a useful ex-
tension of the existing IPR format if a section was inserted to discuss in greater detail the 
institutional mechanics of investment-related policymaking as well as possible inconsis-
tencies, contradictions, and trade-offs between the policies reviewed. Essentially, these are 
different elements of an industrial policy the workings and contents of which should be-
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come more transparent. On this basis it should be easier to develop reasonable proposals 
for a better coordination of policies and for “institutional streamlining“ (including more 
effective institutional arrangements in the area of investment promotion). 
30. A case in point is the “special” investment-trade relationship. A common feature of both 
investment and trade policy is their international focus. Trade and investment are widely 
recognized as mutually reinforcing channels for cross-border activities that enhance a de-
veloping country’s integration into the world economy and may at the same time help to 
facilitate sustained economic growth and thus to promote sustainable development in a 
given country. Empirically, a positive cross-country correlation in fact exists between the 
intensity of international investment and trade links relative to overall economic activities 
(OECD 2002, 11). Moreover, among the various types of foreign investment, efficiency-
seeking operations, and especially “network” or ”global integrator” FDI involving higher 
imports as well as exports, appear to be on the rise. By and large, this kind of FDI also ap-
pears to have a relatively strong (positive) development impact (in terms of employment 
and training or transfer and dissemination of technology, for instance), which of course 
varies in terms of the individual country or country category under consideration. In con-
sequence, trade policies of host countries, and of their trading partners, increasingly ap-
pear to determine a country’s ability to attract “quality” FDI. 
31. IPR reports should treat this nexus in greater depth than they usually have until now. Be-
sides export-processing zones, which are typically discussed at some length, other salient 
features of the trading regime that deserve closer scrutiny include the structure of import 
tariffs (especially their significance for access to intermediate and capital goods), customs 
procedures (as a core element of trade facilitation), trade-related performance require-
ments (like local-content, mandatory-export or trade-balancing provisions) or ease of 
market access and standard of treatment for service providers from abroad (in particular 
trade-facilitating business or “backbone” services like transport and logistics, finance, and 
telecommunications). Deeper analysis along these lines would help to design trade poli-
cies that are more conducive than current trade practices to FDI projects with a lasting 
positive impact on development. In this particular area, IPRs under UNCTAD should also 
work more in tandem with the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  
32. IPRs may not only enhance internal coherence of investment-related rules and practices 
but also serve to make sure that these policies are consistent with obligations assumed by 
the reviewed country under bilateral or multilateral treaties.  
33. Multilateral investment rules under the WTO are still fragmentary and dispersed over a 
number of different agreements (in particular on trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs) and on services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
related sectoral arrangements in areas like finance and telecommunications). A unified set 
of such rules, in the framework of a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) or the 
like, is unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future. The potential for conflict, and 
need for adjustment, at this level is nevertheless considerable, as a number of disputes on 
trade-related performance requirements clearly show. 
34. In practice, however, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are more relevant. The number 
of BITs has greatly increased in recent years. As a result, national regulations on invest-
ment and BIT stipulations often overlap to a high degree. Recurrent provisions in BITs in-
clude obligations to “publish promptly” relevant measures, to “notify” non-conforming 
measures, to respond swiftly to “requests” for information by contracting parties, or to es-
tablish “enquiry points” (OECD 2003, 10). A “new generation” of BITs is also emerging 
in which key concepts like “fair and equitable treatment,” “expropriation,” and “dispute 
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settlement” are clarified. During our conversations in Geneva, though, the impression was 
conveyed that in many cases neither domestic investment legislation nor BITs yet live up 
to modern, state-of-the-art standards of investment regulations as referenced, for instance, 
at UNCTAD. Moreover, as they exist, national rules and BIT provisions appear not al-
ways to be congruent, or indeed may even be openly contradictory one another, such as in 
the field of dispute settlement.  
35. In their section dealing with the regulatory framework for investment, IPR reports typi-
cally also discuss issues relating to international investment agreements (IIAs) and espe-
cially BITs. This analysis could be enhanced by making more transparent existing incon-
sistencies between relevant rules and practices at the national and international/bilateral 
level and proposing reasonable adjustments. UNCTAD could also assist countries in the 
negotiation of BITs. 
Regional IPRs? 
36. Whereas investment issues or policy linkages between investment and trade have for the 
time being effectively been removed from the multilateral trade agenda, ongoing delibera-
tions in the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment notwithstanding, they loom 
larger in regional and bilateral trade agreements. Investment regimes are a common fea-
ture of “modern” integration schemes (“deep integration”) in the context of the “new re-
gionalism.” To what extent investment-related policies should be reconciled or harmo-
nized among host countries in a regional or bilateral context, is a question that would 
seem worth considering in IPR reports for individual countries. There might also be a ra-
tionale for “bundling” IPRs for neighboring countries or regional partners. With Trade 
Policy Reviews in the WTO, this has already occurred (witness the WTO Secretariat’s 
TPR report on SACU, the Southern African Customs Union, in 2003). In our interviews at 
UNCTAD we were told that a regionally based IPR approach (“basket cases”) was un-
charted territory that might confuse clients and grow into an oversized and protracted ex-
ercise, although it might nonetheless be envisaged as an experiment, since as FDI policy 
was “not (meant) to beggar but to prosper thy neighbor”. 
37. Policy areas in need of international coordination include the removal of restrictions 
against FDI (“negative” approach) and, even more importantly, “pro-active” measures to 
attract foreign capital (“positive” approach). An issue of considerable controversy in this 
context concerns the granting of subsidies or use of investment incentives. Avoiding any 
waste of resources and preventing competitive distortions caused by incentive escalation 
is a major economic argument in favor of common investment rules.6 In essence, this also 
holds for investment promotion strategies more generally. Against this background, tech-
nical assistance projects like the development of a regional investment promotion strategy 
for the Andean region (launched via the “Quick Response Window” (QRW) facility 
within UNCTAD’s ASIT (Advisory Services on Investment and Training) program) ap-
pear to lead in the right direction. As regards individual country cases, IPRs occasionally 
criticize incentive policies, as practiced e.g. in Mauritius, for their “expensive piece-meal 
tax give-aways, which have poor strategic rationale,” and recommend “replacing them 
with a more coherent, attractive regime based on strategic goals.” This may help to devise 
more rational investment promotion schemes. 
                                                 
6 On balance, theory and empirical evidence largely favor the elimination of investment incentives (and per-
formance requirements), from both the global and the national perspective (Young / Tavares 2004). 
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Quick Response Window as an “IPR light”! 
38. As mentioned above, the original concept of IPR seemed to follow the slogan “one size 
fits all.” This concept runs the risk of inefficiency when the “amount” of development- 
and FDI-related issues to be solved by external advice differs from country to country. 
Country-specific particularities can exist only when specific questions arise in the context 
of FDI, for example when adjustment to a more open trade policy is pending, when the in-
stitutional set-up of FDI promotion is to be changed, or when FDI and development policy 
have to be re-designed or even start from ‘ground zero’ after political, economic, or mili-
tary crises. Countries also differ in terms of their endowments with organizational or fi-
nancial resources. With the introduction of a “Quick Response Window” (QRW) impor-
tant progress was made in “customizing” IPRs to the real needs of the applicant countries. 
The possibilities opened by QRW should be developed further. 
39. The QRW option was introduced in order to assist countries with swift suggestions on 
solving specific problems. In view of its limited scope but close relation to IPRs, we have 
labeled the QRW option as well as everything between QRW and the full IPR program as 
“IPR light.” This option should be used as a means of achieving more flexibility in the 
coverage of advice in general. 
40. In using this instrument, UNCTAD could learn from (and exchange experience with) the 
WTO’s “Trade Policy Clinic.” This program is designed to help respond quickly and 
flexibly to trade-policy issues/crises or urgent technical assistance needs identified by 
WTO members (i.e. TPC is demand-driven). It provides diagnoses and practical recom-
mendations on how such needs might best be addressed. In this way, TPC makes it possi-
ble to identify gaps in planned technical assistance and answer the type of questions that 
are not covered by WTO’s present activities. 
41. IPR light should not only be an option when countries ask for solutions to specific ques-
tions. Rather, UNCTAD should be given, and take, the right of initiative to suggest an IPR 
light instead of the full program. It could cover, for example, one of the following topics: 
— How to reorganize FDI promotion agencies 
— How to avoid adverse distribution effects of FDI 
— How to optimize the tax system in order to ensure equal treatment of domestic and in-
ternational investors  
— How to adjust to the fuller opening up of an economy to foreign competition 
— How to profit from natural resource-oriented FDI 
There is an obvious link to bilateral and multilateral technical assistance programs, which 
could arrange for specialized experts to help the country in question. 
42. Another advantage of combining the QRW and the IPR concept would be more flexibility 
in adjusting the “level” of assistance to the financial and human resources available in an 
applicant country. For example, in our view a country like Brazil does not really need to 
be assisted through a fully-fledged IPR. A focus on the most pressing issues where do-
mestic capacity is lacking would be more efficient in terms of both time needed and donor 
country/UNCTAD resources spent. 
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2.2 Process-related issues 
Involving stakeholders 
43. The basic aim of IPRs is “...to help countries improve their investment policies....”. To 
this end co-operation with and commitment of top-level government officials is consid-
ered to be of overriding importance for the success of an IPR since they are the ones who 
will ultimately implement the IPR policy recommendations. Backing by highest govern-
ment officials is indispensable for developing a coherent FDI policy at all levels of gov-
ernment and administration. However, it is explicit UNCTAD policy not only to cooperate 
with the government but to involve, as far as possible, all parties that could be affected by 
FDI and FDI-related policy. Besides government and parliament, such “stakeholders” in-
clude above all both local and international businesses and their associations and non-
governmental organizations. 
44. This policy is based on the assumption that broad agreement can be achieved, i.e. that 
diverging interests and policy concepts can be reconciled. In principle, this is a convincing 
concept that has several advantages: First, it is intended to result in a sort of “national 
ownership” of the final IPR outcome. Recommendations assumed in consensus will, it is 
assumed, be better anchored in the host country society. They will thus be more broadly 
accepted and easier to implement. Second, broad ownership of an IPR also increases the 
chances of a coherent and appropriate policy over time, even in case of changes in gov-
ernment policy. Third, involvement of local business should ensure that competition is not 
distorted by privileges for foreign-owned firms over national ones (“reverse” national treat-
ment). At the very least, there will be better transparency as regards the treatment accorded 
to foreign investors. 
45. However, the extensive involvement of national stakeholders may entail costs. It is obvi-
ous that finding a common denominator can result in either meaningless propositions or in 
policy recommendations that will not be successful in attracting FDI. The IPRs available 
so far seem to have solved this trade-off between the need to find consensus and to come 
up with quality recommendations in a way which has not substantially impaired policy 
recommendations. 
46. In total, we therefore consider the involvement of many stakeholders as a positive factor 
in the IPR process. However, it seems to us that further improvements in the formulation 
of recommendations could be achieved by taking into consideration the views and con-
cerns of investors who have left the country and investors who have not yet invested but 
could given the opportunity to do so. Gathering information from such investors may 
prove to be expensive and even difficult, but if achieved, it would provide the host gov-
ernment with clues as to where reforms could be introduced in order to attract new over-
seas investors. 
Internal coordination at UNCTAD 
47. The wealth of data and other information gathered in IPRs for individual countries could 
to some extent be made available in standardized form and thus be used to build data-
bases, or be fed into existing ones, which would permit comparisons among countries. 
48. Benchmarking the country under review with regard to other countries or locations com-
peting for FDI, especially in a regional integration context, is a major building block of 
IPRs and an element that should be reinforced. To this purpose, a complementary instru-
ment particularly useful for IPRs is the Investment Compass (IC), an Internet-based inter-
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active tool developed by UNCTAD’s IPR section proper. It aims to analyze the main eco-
nomic and policy determinants that affect the investment environment. IPR reports can 
both draw on and elaborate ICs in dealing, for instance, with the investment framework. 
IC, again, is comparable to the World Bank’s Doing-business database, which focuses on 
the scope and manner of regulations that enhance business activity and/or constrain it. 
External Coordination 
49. As far as the relationship of IPRs to projects or initiatives by other international organiza-
tions is concerned, a certain measure of competition among different reporting systems 
could in principle help to enhance the quality of their results. This might, for instance, ap-
ply to IPRs and FIAS, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank 
Group, which has a similar mandate, namely to help client countries reach their potential 
for attracting FDI. However, exercises like IPRs, FIAS, and others are essentially about 
creating public goods. This limits the scope for rivalry, while it opens ample space for co-
ordination, cooperation, division of labor, and networking with a view to the various re-
view products. Combining the activities of various institutions in the field of investment-
related policies would indeed be sensible and could be especially meaningful when the 
programs are conducted in tandem. Combinations could come about, as was suggested in 
our talks in Geneva, for instance by means of cross-referencing, in summary form, in the 
respective reports. Evidence of inter-agency cooperation in this area includes the OECD’s 
participation in transition-country surveys such as the IPR on Uzbekistan as well as re-
peated exchange of information on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Reviews and the 
WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews. In the case of Egypt, for instance, the final IPR report, as 
presented at two workshops (in Cairo and Alexandria in early 1999), was available for, 
and cited in, the WTO TPR on Egypt (held in Geneva in June 1999).7 In a similar way, the 
IPR report on Lesotho (published in January 2004) provided inputs to the parallel WTO 
examination of Lesotho’s trade in the context of the Trade Policy Review for SACU, the 
Southern African Customs Union. 
50. From a development perspective, efforts to link up IPRs with the PRSPs (Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers) process and the Integrated Framework (IF) for Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs) appear to be particularly important. Since the overhaul of the IF in July 
2001, which led to a new approach – the IF Pilot Scheme – agreed to by the six core agen-
cies (WTO, UNCTAD, ITC (International Trade Center), UNDP (United Nations Devel-
opment Program), World Bank, and IMF), the “mainstreaming” of trade into overall de-
velopment and poverty reduction strategies has become its centerpiece. The analytical tool 
used to implement “mainstreaming” is what is known as the Diagnostic Trade Integration 
Studies (DTISs), which are then discussed at Trade Integration Strategy Workshops with 
the aim of mobilizing Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) for Trade-Related Ca-
pacity-Building (TRCB). It would be worth considering the possibility of transforming 
DTISs into DTIISs, i.e. Diagnostic Trade and Investment Integration Studies, and of 
complementing TRTA/TRCB with Investment-Related Technical Assistance for In-
vestment-Related Capacity-Building (IRTA/IRCB). IRTA/IRCB would focus on assist-
ing developing countries to develop stronger competences to overcome supply-side con-
straints; to formulate and implement broad-based policies on FDI; and to negotiate and 
implement international treaties and agreements related to foreign investment (OECD 
2002, 32). This is of course the principal mandate of IPRs. It could usefully feed into the 
IF, making it a more comprehensive mechanism for promoting sustainable development. 
                                                 
7 See: IPR Evaluation Report 1999, 4. 
Strengthening the Development Impact of UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Reviews 
German Development Institute  15 
Discussion and communication of the final report 
51. Discussion and communication of the final IPR report is a crucial action that has its influ-
ence on the implementation process. In this respect, the most important aspect seems to be 
the national level: UNCTAD’s policy of holding meetings and seminars with as many 
stakeholders as possible deserves full support. 
At the international level, the Geneva meeting of the Investment Commission serves sev-
eral functions to which we attribute different levels of importance: 
— Transparency for donor countries, which can be an important element in learning from 
former IPRs. 
— Transparency for businesses representing (potential) investors 
— Forum for inter-governmental discussion with countries that could represent compet-
ing locations. 
52. The last-mentioned of these discussions should be confined to less time in order to cut 
back on meaningless political declarations. Instead, it seems to us worthwhile to think 
about participation of a representative from the scientific community who could try to 
provide a “neutral” assessment of the efficiency of the recommendations. 
More concrete recommendations! 
53. The task of deriving persuasive and realizable recommendations is the core of the IPR 
exercise. Often, this is done in a very convincing way when constructive advice is given. 
This holds, for example, for the institutional recommendations for reorganizing invest-
ment promotion in Sri Lanka. 
54. However, there are numerous examples of recommendations framed in rather vague and 
redundant terms (such as “pro-active investment policies”) and often referring to non-
specified “best practices”, “transparency”, “good governance”, “core competencies”. 
Also, vague wording like “consolidating and extending the role of the new Board of In-
vestment” (as in the case of Mauritius) or “elaborate proactive strategies of investment 
promotion at national and sectoral level” (as in the case of Benin), “modernizing the regu-
latory and institutional framework for investment and guaranteeing the correct application 
of existing rules” (as in the case of Algeria) leave much space for interpretation. In the 
same vein, the investment strategy recommended to Lesotho is “to retain existing inves-
tors and diversify investment”, which is self-evident. 
55. Such formulations should not be avoided in principle. They can be provided in order to 
leave room for the development of appropriate decisions and to underscore that national 
policy has retained its autonomy. However, in most cases it seems that vague formulations 
are chosen with no concrete solution in mind. That cannot be much help for the govern-
ment addressed. 
2.3 Implementation-related issues 
56. Implementation of recommendations is of course what the IPR is about. UNCTAD is 
placing increasing weight on it, mostly by holding follow-up meetings with the respective 
governments and offering assistance when needed. This action should be reinforced, using 
“sticks and carrots”, with a focus on the carrots. 
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Mandatory follow-up meetings 
57. The mildest way to nudge governments toward cooperation in the implementation of the 
recommendations would be to agree upon follow-up meetings already at the start as part 
of the entire IPR action. At these meetings, the government would be committed to giving 
account of what has been realized and providing reasons for non-action. The “stick” to 
this end could be to make support by UNCTAD or the donor country dependent on such 
statements of account. The “carrot” could be the amount of assistance granted. This leads 
to an implementation-related issue which, in our view, was given too little weight in pre-
vious IPRs: integration of the IPR program into bilateral and multilateral development as-
sistance. 
Integration with bilateral and multilateral assistance 
58. There seems to be broad scope for integration of IPRs into development assistance. Ca-
pacity-building can be promoted by sending specialists from donor countries to govern-
ments and administrative institutions where particularly debilitating bottlenecks exist. 
Likewise, real investments in infrastructure could be financed in order to increase a coun-
try’s attractiveness for foreign investors. Generally, adjusting development aid to the 
needs identified in IPRs (infrastructure, institution-building, qualification of public offi-
cials and private-sector employees) would not only be helpful for foreign investors, it 
would at the same time improve investment conditions for domestic firms. Integrating IPR 
and development aid would not exclusively mean promotion of and special benefits for 
FDI. It would also include assistance in designing policy measures, such as a competition 
policy that aims at protecting domestic firms and consumers against the superior market 
power of multinationals. 
59. Most of the development assistance elements adjusted to the needs identified by IPR will 
involve costs for development of domestic human resources and some investment for in-
stitution-building and consultants. Therefore, it seems reasonable to allocate a certain per-
centage of the entire IPR budget to implementation measures and to communicate this to 
the country in question. This would give a signal to the recipient country that financial 
means are available for action that has been identified in the IPR or the need for which be-
comes apparent in the course of implementation. 30 % of the budget would seem to be a 
reasonable share. 
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